A few weeks ago, the United States sanctioned the president of the International Criminal Court, a Japanese national, over the court’s arrest warrant targeting Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant.

Regardless of what one thinks of the underlying dispute, what caught many non-Japanese observers off guard was how Japan responded. 

The Japanese government issued neither a condemnation nor a sharp rebuke. The Foreign Ministry said it had “consisetntly supported” the ICC’s work and called the move “very unfortunate,” which was more or less the end of the story, at least in the public eye.

Comments online described the response as non-commital, evasive, and weak, concluding that Japan was unable to stand for its own people. 

If you have spent some time in Japan, however, studying the Japanese conflict resolution mechanism, you might have come to the entirely different conclusion that this was a deliberate, well-practiced form of disagreement that Japan has used with the United States and neighbouring countries for decades. The more interesting part of this is that this approach has brought real results and it is worth understanding because it is applied out of the world of diplomacy, in ordinary byusiness meetings, includng many of the ones I have attended over the years.

Restrain As A Delivery Mechanism

In 1980s, when the Japanese semiconductor manufacturers had come to dominate the global chip market, the American industry accused them of selling below fair value to crush US competitors. American jobs and a strategic industry were at stake, and there was a strong domestic lobby working to bring fair competition back to the market. 

Japan’s public response was almost completely procedural. METI didn’t organize any defiant press conferences or counter-accusations. They sat down with the US Trade Representative and negotiated the 1986 Semiconductor Agreement. Tokyo ultimately made a concession on price but it did so through bureaucratic channels and in a manner that barely registered as conflict to outside observers.

A decade later, in 1995 Washington pushed Japan to accept numerical import targets for auto parts. In response, Japan’s negotiators refused repeatedly until the appearance of a workable compromise. They delivered the refusal politely, without drama, with restrain which once again many outside observers interpreted as weakness. 

In both cases, while outside observers saw restraint as a lack of position, it was the delivery mechanism for one.

The Logic Underneath The Calm

When Japan responds in this way, there are several underlying dynamics that help explain the actions of the Japanese side.

Focus is on the principle, not on the person

“We support the rule of law” is a principle and there is no attack on the other party’s character or motives that might feel personal. This allows the other party to save face and leaves room to keep working together. 

The response is a process

The real disagreement is worked out through legal channels, technical negotiation and formal statements. Seldom, if ever, are there any press conferences casting light on the process and the public language is calibrated to protect the relationship rather than to win the next cycle.

Patience is leverage

During the talks in 1995, when Japan refused to accept numerical targets for auto parts imports, refusing to escalate and refusing to concede is what eventually produced a better outcome for Japan than a loud fight would probably have. 

The relationship outweighs the disagreement

Even when contesting a specific action, the often-unspoken message is “we are still partners, we are still in this together.” Again, even though this may look like a weakness from the outside, it is a reassurance that the long game is more important than any single dispute. 

De-escalation comes before resolution

The first move is usually to lower the temperature by reducing the visibility of the conflict, avoid putting anyone into a public corner and buy time. The actual resolution follows later, behind closed doors, once both sides can move without losing face. While this may look like a delay or even an avoidance tactic, it is a way to create space for the real negotiation to take place away from external pressure or the scrutiny of third parties.

The outcome is not binary

Japanese conflict management tends to resist forcing a dispute into a winner-takes-it-all frame. More often than not, the aim is a settlement which both sides can live with, even if it takes longer to reach. The term 痛み分け (itami wake = sharing the pain) is used when the dispute is resolved without either side claiming outright victory. Both trade cases above are examples of pain sharing because the two sides negotiated compromises rather than capitulation of either side. 

How This Looks Across The Table In A Meeting Room

The same dynamic usually plays out on a much smaller scale, in meeting rooms across Japan. When a Japanese counterpart says “There may still be some concerns regarding the agreement,” the non-Japanese side may hear it as a door opening. But it could be a refusal to proceed under the current conditions, dressed in words that save the other side’s face and leaves the door open. 

Restraint in both action and expression can itself communicate when you need to stop pushing and work on supplying more information, for example, and when not to walk away from something that is still very much on the table.

In any event, however, looking for a solution that helps both sides is not a sign of weakness. Rather, it is a more effective way to turn disagreement into an opportunity for progress.